Toshiba RT-SF 16 Radios and Libyan Guilt

Undated
last edit March 1 2011

It was forensically determined that the model of radio carrying the bomb that brought down PA103 was a Toshiba RT-SF16 BomBeat radio cassette player, a small black-cased unit with twin-speakers. The radio was identified, in an often bizarre process as it's recorded, by fragments of circuit board and melted case plastics found blasted into surrounding clothes and luggage. And it was confirmed by fragments from the paper user's manual, one a full sheet pronouncing the model plain as day, torn up badly by the thousands-degree Semtex supernova a few inches away (below, left).

That last find, called PK/689, is just too much. Decky Horton thought it had been completely intact when she turned it in, and said so under oath at Camp Zeist. It's been explained the damage to the sheet might have been from forensics testing, and the bomb, apparently, did just about nothing to it.

The science was said to find the manual was not folded at the time of blast, meaning it was outside its narrow box, perhaps way out amongst the clothes. That becomes a bit more plausible. But then why were other bits of the same manual blasted into the blue babygro thought to be wrapped directly around the bomb radio box? Of all the fishy clues that suggest planting, this fishy plant would surely grow the most fish if planted.

These clues appeared to me before the context. I was asking why it had to be the RT-SF16 that wound up in the rubble, to necessitate something so obviously foul? The answer I found is put forth by, for example, the esteemed Richard Marquise, onetime overseer of the FBI's investigation. In a "letter to" Lucy Adams, Marquise pointed out how the model of radio itself indicates Libyan guilt:
"It was a senior Libyan official who had ordered the majority of all the Toshiba radios similar to that which carried the bomb. This official also talked in 1986 about putting a bag on a British or American flight from Malta. Ask why?"
As for the talk of bombing planes, Mr. Marquise will be aware that was a dubious claim of desperate defector A.M. Giaka. The official referred to is Said Rashid, head of JSO operations section, who "asked" Giaka himself - a driver for the JSO - to write a report about bombing planes. It's clearly a rubbish claim, among those first offered on the FBI's boat in mid-1991 in order to win witness protection for him and his wife and impending baby. It was dismissed by the Zeist judges, along with Giaka in general, and virtually everything else he said.

As for Rashid's company's purchase of the radios in question, another unbiased expert, Lord Advocate (prosecution) for the Scottish Crown at trial, Lord Colin Boyd, said in remarks on 28 August 2001:
"As if in confirmation of Libya's involvement during the preparation for the trial evidence was obtained from Toshiba which showed that during October 1988 20,000 black Toshiba RT-SF 16 radio cassettes, the type used in the Pan Am bomb, were shipped to Libya. Of the total world-wide sales of that model 76% were sold to General Electric Company of Libya whose chairman was Said Rashid.

Accordingly, its clear that the move of interest by investigators away from the PFLPGC and towards Libya was as a result of the evidence which was discovered and not as a result of any political interference in the investigation."
October 1988, just two month before the bombing, they made sure to conspicuously corner the market on the exact radio they'd turn into a bomb. Not wise, unless you're framing yourself. Some confirmation of the Libyan BomBeat connection did come from the trial:
"Two employees of Toshiba confirmed in their evidence that their company had supplied 20,000 Toshiba RT SF 16 Bombeat radio cassette recorders to Libya in October 1988. It is alleged that the bomb was contained within such a cassette recorder." LTBU daily report, 26 July 2000
Well that certainly depends on how pure the evidence itself was to begin with. But if we accept this claim, there would seem to be a rough correlation - all things being equal - that if you find a SF-16, it's about 76% likely to be JSO-owned, at least until it was stolen from them. That still leaves a 24% rate of non-JSO probability, and of course all things are not equal.

So the allegation per Lord Boyd is that the Libyans first branded this one radio model - and its amazingly durable manuals - as JSO material. And then they made one of those, of all the models on Earth they could have chosen, into a bomb for such a major operation. And they'd do this using a highly-identifiable and exclusive timer set so it would blow up over land and leave the clues to find. Including the conspicuously purchased Maltese clothing tied right to Megrahi. Packed in the case the Giaka "saw" Megrahi holding the day before the bombing. Sent through three airports unaccompanied but without a single trace at the one airport of them that had excellent security and delivered all their evidence.

It's an insane plot, and standard fare for this investigation. Another stupid move by the villains or, depending on your point of view, another sign of frame-up, with no opportunity to lost to emphasize the direction. Libyan-exclusive everything. I don't think that's normally how terrorists work when they're writing their own script.

16 comments:

Rolfe said...

Well, could we look at it a slightly different way?

It wasn't the JSO buying these radios. It was the General Electric Company of Libya. Whose chairman also moonlighted as a senior JSO officer (or vice versa). Fullinquiry has posted about this on Robert Black's blog so hopefully he will come and elaborate.

I think he said that Libya is/was a command economy, and consumer choice wasn't a big concern. If you wanted a ghetto-blaster, then you got the ghetto-blaster the General Electric Company chose. And ghetto-blasters were very popular in Libya in the 1980s, with most hip cool dudes walking around with one. This explains the surprisingly large order for a country about the size of Scotland.

So the thinking is that if you're a terrorist making bombs and you decide you want a ghetto-blaster to hide one in, and you're in Libya, the one you would probably end up getting would be the RT-SF 16. If you were brain-dead, that is. And in fact maybe it's not such a stupid inference, really.

But look at this backwards.

Caustic Logic, you make an excellent point about the Babygro. It was supposed to have been wrapped round the radio, outside the box, to explain why little bits of it were blasted into almost everything. And it was completely shredded. I can believe in the theoretical possibility of the timer fragment surviving (though I don't think it did), but this? It's ridiculous. What were Hayes and Feraday thinking of, trying to make us believe it was possible.

Oh wait, everybody did believe it.

But start from the position that it's a plant, because it can't be real. How did that work?

Claiden found his chip of circuit board in late January. I have no reason to disbelieve Claiden, and I cannot believe anyone had constructed this elaborate plot to introduce clues pointing to Libya within a month of the crash. Which makes that chip kosher.

There were about eight radios it could have been, from that fragment. Other fragments (especially the white plastic) suggested to Hayes and/or Feraday that it was a radio with a white case. They had it nailed as that, in March.

In April they went to Indian Head, where I think the elaborate plot to blame Libya started, and on the way back (I think) Feraday detoured to Japan to the Toshiba headquarters. There he found out more about the range of possible radios that might have had the Claiden chip in it, including the RT-SF16. Which was the same as the one he had identified but with a black case. I postulate that at this point he discovered the October order from Libya, and realised it would be a great thing if only it could have been one of these and not the white-case model.

He went home with samples of the RT-SF16, and its manual. From then on, all the plastic that's found is black. And this impossible, asbestos chunk of the manual appears, tattered, but torn in exactly the right way to preserve the important information. It was right up against the bomb, in its box, under the Babygro which was shredded beyond recognition. But this fragile piece of paper survived being blown all the way to Morpeth, and was picked up by Deccy Horton.

Who did not identify it as the item she remembered finding the day after the crash.

Oh come on, what do you think?

Caustic Logic said...

Sorry for the delay, Rolfe. I have been idisposed, but things are settling back down to half-normal now.

You make a fair point that it was only innuendo or a leap of logic that these radios were obtained by the JSO rather than the GEL company (presumably not affiliated with the American company GE).

However, the point is about the same, as Rashid's connection shows it's at least possible to construe it that way. So, as you note, it's still a poor choice for a JSO plot, even if they did snag some for their own use.

Command economy, check. That sounds good, and explains the large order of a single model of consumer radio. Making one or a few bombs from them is obviously a less rational reason.

As for Claiden, I could see him collaborating perhaps, but there's no need. Decky Horton turned in another presumably honest piece of radio-related evidence that apparently became something else along the way. Perhaps this is similar, supposed impossibility of it's getting lodged in that data plate aside (undecided there until I consider it more closely).

As for the timeline, Boyd sounds silly making it sound like no one even knew until 1999-ish that this purchase happened. It was obviously known a decade by then. Something tells me Feraday didn't discover the Libyan radio on his own from any innocent fragment, however. I think the whole RT-SF16 / RT-8016 (black/white) dance was scripted out to lead where it did in a "natural" seeming way. I suspect it was an early choice of the CIA ringleaders, along with the MST-13 and that Abdelbaset guy with the alias on Malta - all handy loose threads that could have been discovered from day one, to grab onto and start unraveling.

You're not thinking the bomb radio was a RT-8016, are you?

Off the top of my head, a few problems with accepting the circuit board evidence as valid at all:

1) The previously noted problems with the wrong side being blasted on PT/30 and apparently no side on AG/145 (the Claiden find).

2) The only model we have a non-RARDE reason to suspect is the one Khreesat said the fifth device was housed in - a bronze-colored Toshiba RT-F423 model, or something similar enough that he picked that from a catalog. It's not one of the seven that used the board RARDE found.

Going a bit further, and with a grain of salt for Khreesat's credibility, bronze is interesting in roughly matching the suitcase color used (antique copper, alt. bronze). A terrorist aesthete?

Caustic Logic said...

And of course the first of those points is part of a set of oddities, including the PT/30 discovery search and re-search chronology (in the first link of this post and especially here).

None of that is conclusive nor unusual by the standards of the Lockerbie investigation. Which isn't saying much. But I also really think that any questions about the timer surviving go just as strongly, if not more so, for this circuit board. Consider radio board vs. MST-13 in situ (trial loading):

a) some simple resin material not unlike bakelite, vs. 8/9 layers fiberglass
b) broad-side to the blast wave vs. edgewise
c) distance is about equal - insanely close in either case

The only spot where the PT/35(b) is less plausible is in its relatively massive size.

IMO, if you argue the circuit board is plausible, you argue even more strongly that the timer fragment is.

Getting philosophical, I can't rule out either one, really. It's a combination of general implausibility and utter convenience that sets off me alarm bells.

If it's the science that proves an otherwise insane case, it had better be clearly straight, and this isn't. It deserves more scrutiny. I need to get details from Toshiba on this - like is there any white plastic on the SF16 and where? An image of the board - where are the non-obliterated markings "L106" and so on relative to the trial loading's necessary Semtex location? Etc. ...

That, and the tests Wyatt did, but fully open and scientifically rigorous, well-documented and peer-reviewed. What can't someone arrange that? (I'd advise, suitcase arrangements, differing blast levels to try, etc.)

Rolfe said...

You're not thinking the bomb radio was a RT-8016, are you?

I had that as a working assumption, though I recognise it has its problems.

There's absolutely nothing impossible about the finding of the Claiden chip. The data plate was blasted off the container and was found separately. It was found sort of folded over, and when Claiden was handling it he noticed the chip actually lodged inside the fold. There's nothing "non-Newtonian" about this.

I agree it's highly convenient, perhaps suspiciously convenient, but it also happened at such an early stage in the investigation that I have trouble imagining any plot could be sufficiently far advanced to have reached the stage of planting evidence. By the time you get to April/May, yes, that's different. And if they wanted to plant such a chip, April/May at RARDE would have been quite adequate.

I think you're giving the investigators far too much credit for foresight. I don't believe there was any firm intention to fabricate evidence to blame Libya as early as January 1989. May 1989, yes, but not January.

I also don't believe they had Megrahi in their sights as a potential suspect until the autumn of 1990. There's no way the Scottish team would have been allowed to handle Tony Gauci the way they did if that had been the plan.

Yeah, it would be a lot simpler if the bomb radio had been that bronze RT-F423. I just don't see how to read the evidence so that's the case though.

And by the way, Dubious Dick at the JREF forum says the police are investigating Wyatt and close to charging him in relation to this ADE651 quackery scam. I officially do not believe a word that snake-oil merchant says.

Rolfe said...

I think the whole RT-SF16 / RT-8016 (black/white) dance was scripted out to lead where it did in a "natural" seeming way.

You see, that's the sort of thing I see as rabbit-hole material. I totally don't think bent investigators wortk like that. I think it's interfere as little as possible, with the absolute maximum of the visible investigation being kosher.

Choreographing "natural-seeming" blind alleys and red herrings doesn't do it for me I'm afraid.

Rolfe said...

IMO, if you argue the circuit board is plausible, you argue even more strongly that the timer fragment is.

Totally agree. I think the timer fragment is not utterly impossible.

I think it's a fake, but I don't think they faked something completely outside the realms of possibility.

I think it's the Horton fragment that fits that description!

Rolfe said...

By the way, I don't agree with you that the manual was outside the box. The Toshiba wasn't that small. The manual was A4-sized. By far the most probable packing option was that the radio had been replaced in its box with all its original bits, and presented as if it was brand new. In that case the manual would have been inside the box, flat against the side. The radio was big enough for an A4 sheet to fit flat in the box.

Rolfe said...

I just noticed this old comment from Ambrosia in the JREF thread. I don't really understand it. Do you know what he means, or is he himself mixed up?

I am not sure about the make/model of the radio. The Khreesat made bomb recovered by the BKA was in a one speaker radio. The bombeat model has two speakers. The radio had a black plastic casing. an almost identical model using a white casing was sold almost exclusively to Libya. Feraday (I think) got his serial numbers mixed up giving evidence.

Caustic Logic said...

Sorry, still not up to even half speed, but my internet's back, if not time or energy to do much with it.

I agree it's highly convenient, perhaps suspiciously convenient, but it also happened at such an early stage in the investigation that I have trouble imagining any plot could be sufficiently far advanced to have reached the stage of planting evidence.

Double-checking the timeline, indeed as recorded, the circuit board bits of AG/145 were IDd as the 8016 in early February '89. I thought maybe it was later ... maybe it was. Bollier and Cannistraro (or whoever exactly) were planting ideas to the effect of Libyan involvement by this time, but for RARDE to be re-defining whatever Claiden might've found is admittedly something of a stretch.

Or is it?

I also don't believe they had Megrahi in their sights as a potential suspect until the autumn of 1990.

By "they" here you mean RARDE, correct? I dpn't rule it out, nor believe it.

Yeah, it would be a lot simpler if the bomb radio had been that bronze RT-F423. I just don't see how to read the evidence so that's the case though.

The fact it didn't appear might argue in its favor, IMO.

Curious, if the fragments of AG/145 and PT/30 are legit, why did the bomb-ward face of the board, 1 inch from touching it, survive, un-pitted, white paint markings intact to aid ID? Again, it was a much weaker blast wave, two feet out, after tearing through the suitcase and container, that ruptured the 747. But it couldn't melt the paint saying "hi, I'm the board from one of seven radios in the whole world that includes the one in the whole world just branded as possible Libyan intel material."

It's that coincidence too I founder on. Khreesat might've lied about the radio model used, of course, But why would Abu Elias or whoever choose a model from just that pool?

Caustic Logic said...

Curious, if the fragments of AG/145 and PT/30 are legit, why did the bomb-ward face of the board, 1 inch from touching it, survive, un-pitted, white paint markings intact to aid ID? Again, it was a much weaker blast wave, two feet out, after tearing through the suitcase and container, that ruptured the 747. But it couldn't melt the paint saying "hi, I'm the board from one of seven radios in the whole world that includes the one in the whole world just branded as possible Libyan intel material."

It's that coincidence too I founder on. Khreesat might've lied about the radio model used, of course, But why would Abu Elias or whoever choose a model from just that pool?

I officially do not believe a word that snake-oil merchant says.

That's fine, and I still need to revise myself a little here. But please don't fall into the trap of believing the opposite (if he says unlikely, it must be likely, etc.)

You see, that's the sort of thing I see as rabbit-hole material. I totally don't think bent investigators wortk like that. I think it's interfere as little as possible, with the absolute maximum of the visible investigation being kosher.

Choreographing "natural-seeming" blind alleys and red herrings doesn't do it for me I'm afraid.


cont'd

Caustic Logic said...

It would be smarter to interferee little, but ... There seems to be a lot of inconsistencies, back-dating, etc. If we have any manipulation, by a trusted very few as would be wise, who better than top-secret Feraday? And as it comes down to him or a few others, it also comes down to plans they would act on (neither random, or constrained by reality), and personal psychology even.

Manual outside box, you could be right. Is the box that big? Narrow dimension more than 8"? I guess it could be, looking again.

And of course, we're refering to alleged, implicit placemement of that Libyan-radio paper manual that survived the blast.

I'm pretty sure Ambrosia's mixed up, just got the models backwards. Funny thing, that reminds me of another very interesting point I'll come back to ...

Rolfe said...

As regards identifying Megrahi as a suspect, I don't believe he personally was on the radar at all until about September 1990. The only reference I can find to how he got on the radar is from Paul Foot, who says that Edwin pointed his presence at Malta that morning out to the investigators after they had tracked MEBO down (officially) as the manufacturer of the MST-13.

Now you could say this was all a pre-set plan, that nobody was going to acknowledge Megrahi as a suspect until the MST-13 had been identified and Bollier had provided the information. And of course we think that took a lot longer than was anticipated due to Williamson not managing to trace the chip's origin.

However, if there as an intention from 1989 to pin the blame on Megrahi, I simply can't see the Scottish cops being allowed to spend a year trying to persuade Tony that Abu Talb bought the clothes. There was far too big a risk they might have succeeded, and not been able to change his mind, or simply confused him so much that he wasn't prepared to identify anyone. I'm sure if Megrahi had really been the intended fall guy back then, some evidence would have emerged to start softening Tony up in the right direction much much earlier.

I think the head of the investigation was quite content so long as the cops weren't getting anywhere close (and while they were concentrating on Malta they weren't going to get close), and then bring up the Libya clues as and when they came to the fore. I think finding that a real live Libyan was in the right place at the right time to be a plausible suspect was icing on the cake.

Caustic Logic said...

Giaka of course mentioned Megrahi's visit immediately to the CIA in December 1988. When "they" decided to go for him would vary by theys. Whenever it happened, I think we could agree it went CIA -FBI - Scots, so what was going on on Malta at a certain time might well not line up with what the CIA was setting up at the same time.

I think finding that a real live Libyan was in the right place at the right time to be a plausible suspect was icing on the cake.

Maybe, but what a coincidence it fit so perfectly on top, when nothing else I can see would have. I still suspect theicing was picked out first ad the cake baked to fit beneath it. Amazingly fortuitous coincidences, multiple ones, in the context of this case, I just can't accept that way.

Like the coincidence that Abu Elias or whoever chose one of seven models on earth that had a matching board with the lucky SF-16. All they needed was a bunch of planted black plastic and a manual cover, and at least we can agree on those,

But that initial luck ... allowed you to make a less complicated answer than mine. It's great though, we have different angles, and people can dismiss us as not being 100% in agreement of the minute details, so we must be full of it. (rolls eyes)

Rolfe said...

As I understand it, what Giaka told the CIA about originally was Megrahi's visit to Malta on 7th December - not about Abdusamad on 20th/21st.

I think, also, that Megrahi being at Luqa that morning wasn't that big a coincidence. Given that LN147 left at the same time as KM180, and given the amount of Libyan coming and going through Malta, I suspect the chances of a potential suspect being in the right place at the right time was quite high. If it hadn't been Megrahi it would have been somebody else.

About the radio, though, I agree with you. I'm allergic to the number of coincidences in this case. I'm accepting it for the moment, but I don't think its really a satisfactory explanation and I'm sure there's more to this aspect than we've yet realised.

Caustic Logic said...

Well, I need to find a public source for those cables so I can see for myself and share on the site. But I gather the main thing Giaka ever knew was who was coming and going through Malta. I've heard the first mention of Megrahi was sometime in December, and I would think both visits would be reported pretty much as they happen (at the next meeting).

Even if he wasn't mentioned earlier, he'd appear on the CIA's radar (not for Lockerbie, just their general radar) at just about the time of the bombing, at the latest. That alone would be a first stroke of bad luck. He was available for consideration by these movers and shakers from the beginning. I can't say how long they delayed before deciding to target him in particular.

As you say, there were oher Libyans they could have picked, but at the least we agree they were looking for Libyans, and eventually they found Megrahi the ripest one to pick.

Radio, right. I try to convince, even as I respect diversity of opinions. It comes from flailing fruuitlessly against granite minds that NEVER budge. Sometimes you can bo obstinate, but not as bad as me, and I should mellow out on the arguing every little.

Rolfe said...

Paul Foot.

Majid Giaka originally approached the American embassy in Malta in August 1988, four months before the Lockerbie bombing. His long series of meetings with American intelligence officials in Malta began in September 1988, the same month he started getting regular payments from the CIA.

His information was patchy and unreliable. He pretended he was a senior official in the Libyan intelligence organisation JSO though in reality (as the Americans quickly realised) he was a former garage mechanic who helped to maintain JSO vehicles and had graduated to the exalted position of assistant station manager for Libyan Arab Airlines.

The CIA kept him on their payroll with increasing reluctance. They had few other direct human contacts with Libyan intelligence, and in view of the American hostility to Libya and the fear of terrorism from there, any source, even if unreliable, was better than none.

Scraps of information passed on by Giaka during 41 clandestine meetings between August 1988 and July 1991 were duly logged. In October 1988 he revealed that a managerial colleague at Luqa airport, Lamin Fhimah, had kept explosives in his desk drawer. In December 1988, the month of the Lockerbie bombing, he was asked about the movements of JSO officials through Luqa airport. He replied that a man he regarded as a senior JSO officer, Abdelbasset Ali Mohamed Al Megrahi, had passed through Luqa airport on 7 December. These two men eventually became the suspects for the Lockerbie bombing.